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ABSTRACT 
Formal independence of non-executive directors should not be used as a mask for a potential problem 
of self-interest, as it can occur in many forms. While laws regulate more severe forms of self-interest, 
little attention is given to subtle governance controls that can seek to align a non-executive’s interests 
with the company’s. The increased role non-executives have on a board of directors exacerbates this 
problem with little consideration or evidence to support improved governance. This article is an 
empirical analysis seeking to identify if self-interest is a problem for non-executive directors and 
whether there are any available governance controls or if regulation is required. It also endeavours to 
inform a larger empirical study that seeks to hone in on the problem of self-interest for non-executives. 
This article provides evidence that self-interest is a potential problem if left unchecked. 
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1. SELF-INTERESTED NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
Corporate law has developed rules that govern some of the most severe form of self-
serving behaviour.1 Corporate governance, however, offers subtle ex ante interest alignment 
between controllers and owners. This interest alignment has received substantial attention in 
the literature in respect of executive directors, yet little attention is given to non-executive 
directors and their potential for self-serving behaviour. “Independence” is a formative means 
of denying possible conflict but this can be highly misleading in modern corporate 
governance as non-executives take on a more substantive role, caused by corporate scandals 
and an increased ability for companies to diversify. There are many reasons non-executive 
directors might be self-interested and it should not be taken for granted that increased 
involvement will lead to better corporate governance. The purpose of this study is to provide 
provisional empirical data on non-executive director self-interest from an initial sample. This 
will facilitate a larger empirical study that will identify and analyse matters such as the nature 
of the conflict as well as the impact this can have on corporate performance. Given the 
relatively sparse amount of literature on non-executive self-interest it is important to start 
with a smaller data sample to help identify the basic nature of that self-interest before it can 
be honed in on and refined. This preliminary evidence does that and provides some useful 
empirical evidence in the process. The preliminary study uses multiple directorships as a 
proxy for self-interest. Measuring these against elements of corporate governance the analysis 
will offer evidence on whether non-executives are self-interested and identifying potential 
governance controls on that self-interest. 
 
2. WHY IS SELF-INTEREST A PROBLEM? 
Non-executive directors are meant to monitor and constructively challenge executive 
management2 meaning non-executive liability is often based on negligence for failure to 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Companies Act 2006, ss.175-177 
2 UK Corporate Governance Code, Para A.4 
perform this task reasonably.3 Therefore, Cheffins and Black argued that private enforcement 
of directors’ duties against non-executive directors are more likely to be that of duty of care 
rather than conflict of interest.4  Yet, after corporate failures or scandals, non-executives are 
often pointed to as a means of improving governance to reduce the risk of such events 
occurring.5 The result of these reports is often to make policy suggestions on increased 
involvement i.e. through Corporate Governance Codes. So much so that non-executive 
directorships in the United Kingdom went from practically non-existent at the time of the 
Cohen Report in 1945,6 when it was identified that there was no internal monitoring body 
responsible for supervision; to a “job for the boys”;7 to 1985 where only 6% of companies 
lacked non-executives and on 20% of companies they were in the majority;8 to 2014 where 
92% of FTSE 350 companies had a majority of non-executives on their board, up from 89% 
in 2013.9  
 
                                                           
3 See, for example, Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 477; Re Westmid Packing Services [1998] 2 All ER 124; 
Equitable Life Assurance v Bowley [2003] EWHC 2263 
4 B Cheffins and B Black, ‘Outside Director Liability Across Countries’ (2006) 84 Texas Law Review 
1385, 1405 
5 The Hampel Report, Final Report: of the committee on corporate governance, (January, 1998), 
para 3.8; The Higgs Report, Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, (January, 
2003) para 1.6; The Walker Review, A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial 
industry entities, (November, 2009), para 2.7 
6 The Cohen Report, The report of the committee on company law amendment, (1945) Cmd 6659 
(hereinafter Cohen Report)  
7 S Aris, ‘Non-Executive Directors: Their changing role on UK boards’ (1986) Economist Intelligence 
Unit Special Report no 244, 6-8 
8 ibid 
9 See, Grant Thornton Corporate Governance Review, ‘Plotting a new course to improved governance’ 
(2014) <http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/Global/Publication_pdf/Corporate-Governance-Review-
2014.pdf> accessed 13th May 2015 
It is not just corporate scandals that increased the need for non-executive involvement and 
it is unlikely that this was the catalyst for their increasing numbers. It was noted by the Higgs 
Report that the increased complexities of business made it more difficult for shareholders to 
hold management to account, facilitating the need for non-executives.10 Perhaps more 
importantly, reduction in trade barriers that culminated in the single market in the EU in 
1992, and the demise of the ultra vires11 rule facilitated business expansion and 
diversification. In uncertain market conditions, particularly where a company is looking to 
grow in to new markets, the hiring of a non-executive director who is familiar with the market 
reduces dependencies on external resources by reducing contractual costs and uncertainty.12 
Therefore, non-executive directors became more useful to the company as they could 
facilitate company expansion. Whether the non-executive would actually do this though is 
just one example of the potential for self-interest. 
 
With increased responsibility comes with it the increased risk of using that influence for 
self-interested means. Whilst the majority of cases against non-executives will be for duty of 
care, recent cases have been faced with such circumstances of self-interest.13 However, 
private enforcement of duties is rare,14 particularly against non-executive directors.15 Whether 
                                                           
10 The Higgs Report, Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, (January, 2003) 
11 See, for example, Companies Act 2006, s. 31; cf. Johns v Balfour (1889) 5 T.L.R. 389; Re 
Introductions Ltd (No. 1) [1970] Ch. 199; Re Horsely & Weight [1982] Ch. 442, 448; Rolled Steel 
Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corp [1986] Ch. 246, 288-9;  
12 See, for example, J Pfeffer, ‘Organization Theory and Structural Perspectives on Management (1991) 
17(4) Journal of Management 789; K Eisenhardt and C Schoonhoven, ‘Resource-Based View of 
Strategic Alliance Formation: Strategic and Social Effects in Entrepreneurial Firms’ (1996) 7(2) 
Organization Science 136 
13 Mission Capital Plc v Sinclair [2008] EWHC 1339 (Ch); Cambridge v Makin [2011] EWHC 12 (QB); 
[2008] B.C.C. 866; Burns v Financial Conduct Authority [2014] UKUT 0509 (TCC) 
14 S Deakin and A Hughes, Directors’ Duties: Empirical Findings – Report to the Law Commissions 
(ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge 1999) (hereinafter ESRC Report); J 
the threat of litigation is enough to deter self-interest is not the focus of this article but it is 
considered that the lack of legal deterrent can lead to bad governance.16 Therefore, ex ante 
governance incentives may provide a viable solution to reduce the risk of self-interest 
amongst non-executive directors.  
 
To analyse this, multiple directorships are used as a proxy for self-interest. Agency theory 
would contend that the taking of multiple directorships by non-executives is a form of 
perquisite consumption17 that, in excess, can be detrimental to the companies involved for a 
number of reasons and can generate agency costs. For example, appointments may be based 
on contacts and networks rather than merit or signals from the managerial labour market.18 
This may lead to excessive executive compensation19 due to the non-executives being 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Armour et al, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom 
and United States’ (2009) 6(4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 687 
15 B Cheffins and B Black, ‘Outside Director Liability Across Countries’ (2006) 84 Texas Law Review 
1385; see also, H Hirt, ‘The review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors: a critical 
assessment with particular reference to the German two-tier board system: Part 2’ (2003) 14(8) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 261, 266-7; The Higgs Report, Review of the role 
and effectiveness of non-executive directors, (January, 2003) para 14; Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch. 204; Mission Capital Plc v Sinclair [2008] EWHC 1339 (Ch); 
[2008] B.C.C. 866  
16 Z Zhang ‘Legal Deterrence: the foundation of corporate governance – evidence from China’ (2007) 
15(5) Corporate Governance: An International Review 741 
17 S Ferris, M Jagannathan and A Pritchard, ‘Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors 
with Multiple Board Appointments’ (2003) 58(3) The Journal of Finance 1087 
18 E Fama and M Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal of Law and 
Economics 301; L Bebchuk and J Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation, (Harvard University Press, 2006); Qianru Qi, ‘How Does the Director’s Social Network 
Matter? Evidence From Structure Estimation’ (2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786555> accessed 14th 
April 2011 
19 L Renneboog and Y Zhao, ‘Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation’ 
(2011) 17(4) Journal of Corporate Finance 1132 
unwilling to challenge the executives who supported their appointment. Non-executives may 
also be unable to fulfil all their duties for each one of their undertakings at the different 
companies.20 However, it is not advocated that companies should prevent non-executives 
from taking any external appointments, as there are often many benefits in doing so. Benefits 
include reducing uncertainties in the market21 and improvements in company performance.22 
The point is to highlight how companies might control an excess of external appointments 
and this may serve as a partial answer as to how a company can create an alignment of 
interests to prevent or guard against self-interested opportunism.  
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses are intended to look at different corporate governance mechanisms to see 
if this has a relationship with external appointments. This will allow for some inferences to be 
drawn from the data to consider how non-executives might be controlled beyond formal 
independence. The hypotheses will also aim to look at the pre and post financial time periods 
to see if there are any significant changes in behaviour. 
 
H1:  Non-executives will hold more appointments where remuneration is higher 
Clearly, non-executives need to be remunerated; however, as Fama identified, if you 
pay an individual up front, what is to stop the individual consuming more perquisites to the 
                                                           
20 S Ferris, M Jagannathan and A Pritchard, ‘Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors 
with Multiple Board Appointments’ (2003) 58(3) The Journal of Finance 1087, 1088; citing M Lipton and 
J Lorsch, ‘A modest proposal for improved corporate governance’ (1992) 48 Business Lawyer 59 
21 See, for example, J Pfeffer, ‘Organization Theory and Structural Perspectives on Management (1991) 
17(4) Journal of Management 789; K Eisenhardt and C Schoonhoven, ‘Resource-Based View of 
Strategic Alliance Formation: Strategic and Social Effects in Entrepreneurial Firms’ (1996) 7(2) 
Organization Science 136 
22 J Cotter, A Shivdasani, M Zenner, ‘Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth 
during tender offers?’ (1997) 43(2) Journal of Financial Economics 195 
detriment of his principal?23 Since there are rarely wage revision processes or long-term 
incentive schemes for non-executives, for reasons of independence, it is hypothesised that as 
remuneration increases non-executive multiple directorships will also increase. This suggests 
that additional appointments are perquisite consumption for the non-executive.24 If evidence 
is found to the contrary then it can be argued that higher remuneration is accompanied by 
greater responsibilities, therefore they are unable to take on more appointments. Renneboog 
and Zhao hypothesised that non-executives who are more locally constrained earn a higher 
fee since their isolation may be perceived as an indication of their independence and superior 
monitoring capabilities.25 
 
H2: Non-executives with more equity will hold fewer appointments 
Equity is tied to the value of the company. As such non-executives with a lower 
equity holding will have greater incentives to prefer short-term personal interests to those 
long-term interests of the company. For example, Baghat et al26 showed that directors who 
have a higher equity ownership in the company are more likely to remove an under-
performing CEO. As a consequence, as Ferris et al evidenced, non-executives with greater 
equity ownership will hold fewer additional appointments.27 Their personal wealth is tied to 
the value of the company and so non-executives will be less willing to shirk their 
responsibilities and will provide better oversight of management. If data shows that non-
                                                           
23 E Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88(2) Journal of Political Economy 
288, 306 
24 S Ferris, M Jagannathan and A Pritchard, ‘Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors 
with Multiple Board Appointments’ (2003) 58(3) The Journal of Finance 1087, 1097 
25 L Renneboog and Y Zhao, ‘Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation’ 
(2011) 17(4) Journal of Corporate Finance 1132, 1135 
26 S Baghat, D Carey and C Elson, ‘Director Ownership, Corporate Performance and Management 
Turnover’ (1999) 54 Business Lawyer 885   
27 S Ferris, M Jagannathan and A Pritchard, ‘Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors 
with Multiple Board Appointments’ (2003) 58(3) The Journal of Finance 1087, 1097 
executives continue to be influenced by their equity holdings, then this may serve as a 
realistic alternative to limits or restrictions on appointments that are used in other 
jurisdictions.28 However, equity may be questioned as a viable governance mechanism, by 
itself, given its previous shortcomings in corporate scandals29 and might not improve 
governance. 
 
H3: Non-executives will hold fewer appointments where there are more agency problems in 
the company 
Perry and Peyer found that executive directors would be less willing to take on 
additional appointments where agency problems in the company are greater.30 This study used 
two proxies only to determine agency problems. The agency problems they identified and 
tested were the number of independent directors and percentage of executive ownership.31 
This study uses nine agency problems32 and makes a similar hypothesis for non-executive 
directors. This will make the test more robust. As well as examining the impact of the extent 
of agency problems collectively, individual agency problems such as the ratio of independent 
directors to executives, the duality of CEO and chair positions, board meetings missed/held 
and board size can be explored. This is justified by the argument that where there are greater 
                                                           
28 Capital Requirements Directive IV 2013/36/EU, Art 91(1)-(6); Dutch Corporate Governance Code: 
Principles of good corporate governance and best practice provisions (2008) para 39; The French 
Recommendation of Corporate Governance 2011, Part II Para D.2; The German Stock Corporation Act 
(AtkG), s. 100 
29 See, for example, B Holmstrom and S Kaplan, ‘The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s right 
and what’s wrong?’ 15(3) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8 
30 T Perry and U Peyer, ‘Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder’s Perspective’ (2005) 
60(4) The Journal of Finance 2083 
31 ibid, 2096 
32 LTIS to fixed remuneration; executive ownership; executive multiple directorships; ratio of 
independent directors to executives; board size; number of board meetings; number of remuneration 
committee meetings; number of board meetings missed; and CEO-Chair duality 
agency problems in the company, the non-executives will recognise the need to monitor 
senior management more closely. As a consequence they will be less able to take on other 
appointments. Another reason may be that executive management may be able to impose 
higher agency costs on the company where non-executives have fewer external appointments 
based on Masulis and Mobbs’ observation that non-executives may become more reliant on 
the company when they hold fewer appointments and thus less willing to challenge.33 
Conversely, if non-executive multiple directorships increase with the volume of agency 
problems this may be a result of what Ferris et al stated that ‘reduced monitoring by such 
directors allows managers to impose greater agency costs on the firm’.34   
 
H4: After 2008 non-executives will hold fewer appointments 
In 2008 the economy suffered a significant contraction. This event may have 
significantly altered the way directors behave in regard to accepting multiple directorships 
and monitoring executive management. 
 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven observed additional appointments can be beneficial in difficult 
market conditions. This is supported by Erkens et al35 study that showed higher performance 
levels in companies with access to expertise compared with those boards with more 
independent directors. For executive directors, Booth and Deli found that the CEO was more 
likely to hold fewer appointments where growth opportunities were greater.36 In a recession, 
                                                           
33 R Masulis and S Mobbs, ‘Are all Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship 
Market’ (2011) 66(3) The Journal of Finance 823 
34 S Ferris, M Jagannathan and A Pritchard, ‘Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors 
with Multiple Board Appointments’ (2003) 58(3) The Journal of Finance 1087, 1096 
35 D Erkens, M Hung and P Matos, ‘Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence 
from Financial Institutions Worldwide’ (2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397685> date accessed 1st 
Nov 2010 
36 J Booth and D Deli, ‘Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs’ (1996) 40(1) 
Journal of Financial Economics 81 
growth opportunities are likely to be lower therefore leading to a larger number of external 
positions.  
 
However, Fich and Schivdasani found that directors were more likely to depart 
underperforming companies. Linking this with Lorsch and MacIver’s37 qualitative study that 
a primary reason behind accepting an appointment is the reputation of the company it would 
be expected that companies’ reputation would decrease in a recession leading to fewer 
appointments. As well as a decrease in reputation, it is likely that the non-executives’ 
reputation and worth in the managerial labour market may also be diminished after a financial 
crisis, especially those with more external appointments, which would be contrary to what 
was reported by Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven. Gilson reported, for example, that non-
executives who left a company that had difficulties with its finances held fewer external 
appointments after departure than those who left in other circumstances.38 Therefore non-
executives with more external appointments will have less worth in the managerial labour 
market resulting in a decline in additional appointments held after 2008.  
 
As well as identifying whether non-executives hold more or fewer appointments after 
the financial crisis, the other hypotheses will also be tested pre and post crisis to see whether 
there are any changes in behaviour. Whilst the hypotheses will remain the same any changes 
in the results may indicate changing behaviour in different market conditions.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
                                                           
37 M Conyon and L Read, ‘A model of the supply of executives for outside directorships’ (2006) 12 
Journal of Corporate Finance 645, 651; citing J Lorsch and E MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The 
Reality of America’s Corporate Boards, (Harvard Business School Press, 1989) 
38 S Gilson, ‘Bankruptcy, boards, banks and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership 
and control when firms default’ (1990) 27(2) Journal of Financial Economics 355 
The dataset was from 150 cases – thirty FTSE 100 companies selected at random from 
the London Stock Exchange website39 over a five year period, 2006-2010. The time series40 
will add to the observations about controlling self-interest to see if there are any significant 
changes over time, particularly in different market conditions before and after 2008. The 
relevant data was collected from the annual reports, which are required to be made available 
for the last five years.41 The data was collected at company level, rather than for individual 
directors. This was done as the study is interested in regulating self-interest generally. 
Essentially the study aims to identify reasons why some companies have non-executives with 
higher levels of external appointments in order to identify conditions that facilitate increased 
external appointments, rather than why individuals take more appointments. This will identify 
ways governance mechanisms could be used to reduce the potential for self-interest in 
external appointments. 
 
For most companies the annual report relates to the period of 1st January to 31st 
December. However, some companies’ data in their annual reports ran for different periods. 
Where a financial year did not coincide with the calendar year the data collected was 
attributed to the year where the most months had been covered.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Data 
4.1.1 Director and Multiple Directorships data 
For any director serving for the whole year and any external appointments held for the 
whole year are given a value of 1 otherwise the value was 0.5. These were then converted in 
to full time equivalents (FTE). FTEs were used for multiple directorships, directors serving, 
independent directors and chairs. A multiple directorship was classified as one that attracts 
                                                           
39 <http://www.londonstockexchange.com>  
40 Data collected is also a panel which would allow for control of firm and organisation type in future 
studies 
41 Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC Ch 2 Art 4 
fiduciary accountability in a private, for profit role. Therefore membership of professional 
bodies, non-profit firms etc. were excluded. Multiple directorship data for directors not listed 
in the annual report due to retirement were collected using the previous year’s annual report 
and cross-referenced with a company they served on.    
 
Table A reports the descriptive statistics on directorships levels and multiple directorships 
in companies.  There seems to be no obvious pattern between the number of appointments 
and external directorships. However, there is a noticeable drop of 17% in the number of 
external appointments held by executives from 2008 to 2010. This relates to Hypothesis 4, 
that market conditions can impact on director behaviour in how many appointments they take. 
The number of non-executive external appointments has also been in decline after 2007 but is 
still just above the lowest levels reported in 2006.   
 
Despite a slight decrease in the number of non-executives serving, 7.73 to 7.67, an 
interesting observation from the data is that whilst the maximum number of multiple 
directorships on a board has been in decline, from 45 to 38, the minimum has been rising, 3 to 
7. This suggests that smaller boards are now allowing for more external appointments, whilst 
bigger boards have scaled back external appointments. This may be related to market 
conditions that directors of larger companies tried to focus attention on a particular business 
to aid survival in difficult market conditions. The shift in public perception relating to 
directors who subsequently resigned or were removed from positions may also have had an 
influence, perhaps, prompting resignations in larger companies to improve public perception 
of commitment. Conversely, smaller FTSE 100 companies may have appointed directors with 
more external appointments to help reduce uncertainties in the market, which would account 
for the increase in the minimum number of external appointments. This is consistent with 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven thesis in Hypothesis 4. Reputational influences may have also 
played a part with larger companies losing reputation and prestige thus attracting fewer 
talented individuals, whilst existing directors with high volumes of additional appointments 
lost worth in the managerial labour market and became less desirable to appoint. 
Table A: Board External Appointments 
Variable (n = 150) Min  Max Mean SD 
Executive 
Directorships  
1.5 8 4.09 1.32 
2006 1.5 6.5 4.22 1.31 
2007 1.5 7 4.20 1.34 
2008 2 7.5 4.18 1.20 
2009 2 8 4.02 1.32 
2010 1.5 8 3.85 1.45 
Non-Executive 
Directorships 
3.5 14.5 7.83 2.41 
2006 3.5 14.5 7.73 2.53 
2007 4 14 7.78 2.39 
2008 4 14 8.07 2.61 
2009 4.5 14.5 7.90 2.36 
2010 5 13.5 7.67 2.26 
Executive Multiple 
Directorships 
0 10 3.04 2.30 
2006 0 9.5 3 2.54 
2007 0 8 3.07 2.25 
2008 0 10 3.40 2.44 
2009 0 9 2.93 2.27 
2010 0 7 2.82 2.07 
Non-Executive 
Multiple 
Directorships 
3 45 18.38 8.05 
2006 3 40.5 17.40 8.01 
2007 4 40.5 19.15 8.32 
2008 4 45 18.73 8.20 
2009 8 41 18.55 8.61 
2010 7 38 18.07 7.50 
 
 
 
4.1.2 Remuneration data 
Executive remuneration has been divided into three different categories: (1) fixed 
remuneration of salary and benefits; (2) Annual bonus of shares and cash including any 
deferred; and (3) Long Term Incentive Schemes (LTIS). These categories and what is 
included is mainly based on the Listing Rules (LR) definitions as opposed to the Large and 
Medium Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008/410. The 
only relevant distinction between the two definitions of these categories is in regard to 
deferred annual bonuses. Whilst the 2008 Regulations class deferred bonuses as a LTIS42 the 
Listing Rules do not.43 This definition from the LR is used to carve out LTIS from deferred 
bonuses, but the two are merged back together when calculating the ratio of LTIS to fixed 
remuneration for the purposes of analysing this specific agency problem. 
 
To calculate the value of the LTIS the amount of shares awarded is multiplied by the 
value of the company’s shares at the time of award and not how much of the award vested. 
This is done to judge how the director is incentivised. As for the calculation of share options, 
since share options are paid for by directors through a right to acquire at an agreed exercised 
price, the value of awards is taken at the value of those exercised in that year.  
 
Figure 1 give a break down of executive remuneration. The biggest portion of executive 
compensation is LTIS making up 46% of their overall package. Despite a sharp fall in bonus 
and LTIS after the 2008 crash, these awards reached new highs in 2010 as measured by the 
mean. However the percentage of performance related pay that made up the total was 47% in 
2007 and 2010 and 39% in 2006 and 2009. In terms of fixed remuneration for executive 
directors’ salary and benefits, despite a continual growth in the mean paid to executives, the 
median has decreased for two consecutive years in 2009-10. This is suggestive of outliers, 
which is supported by the increase in the standard deviation. Annual bonuses and share 
options were also squeezed in 2008, which was to be expected as executives forfeited their 
bonuses and share prices dwindled with the recession.  
 
Whilst looking at individual sectors may not be reliable due to the size of the dataset, 
some observations can still be drawn from the descriptive statistics. Companies in the 
banking, oil and gas producers, utilities and financial services were the sectors to pay 
                                                           
42 Large and Medium Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations (SI 2008/410) 
Schedule 5 Regulation 8 Part 3 Article 11 
43 Financial Conduct Authority Listing Rules 9.8.8 
executives the most. The highest paid executives were those at Barclays in 2007 to its six 
executives who served that year. Barclays also paid the most per executive in 2010 where it 
awarded £36,950,000 (£12,317,000 per executive) to its three executives. The lowest was 
paid in 2006 to the two executives of Autonomy Corporation who awarded £768,600.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Executive Remuneration 
 
Non-executive remuneration is paid in fees based on their role on the board. Table B 
offers some descriptive statistics on how non-executive fees have changed over the five-year 
period. Since it was rare for a non-executive to receive bonuses or equity based compensation 
the figures below only consider the fees paid to non-executives. Generally, the average paid 
to non-executives has increased. The overall increase in the average paid to a company’s non-
executives has been around £150,000 or 17%. This is despite a slight decrease in the average 
number of non-executives serving. Despite the increase in the mean, the standard deviation is 
observed to have increased with the amount paid to non-executives, based on the median, 
having levelled off. This again suggests the presence of outliers. Sectors where fees paid to 
non-executives were the highest included banking, oil and gas producers, pharmaceuticals, 
tobacco and food producers. However, when taking into account the amount paid per director 
the highest paid non-executives were those in banking, oil and gas producers, pharmaceuticals 
and general mining. It appears these sectors are the ones pulling the mean up.  
 
Table B: Non-executive Remuneration Breakdown  
Variable (n = 150) Min  Max Mean SD Median 
Remuneration £98000 £2603000 £958152 594747.24 £808500 
2006  £102000 £2603000 £897233 747308.63 £696500 
2007 £98000 £1831000 £846133 419648.52 £771500 
2008 £124000 £2154000 £950600 506061.64 £855500 
2009 £267000 £2408000 £1043500 619674.98 £830000 
2010 £377870 £2351000 £1053296 639501.04 £849500 
 
4.1.3 Equity holdings 
How much time an individual will dedicate to their role and whether they take on 
additional appointments may be affected by how much equity they hold in the company. This 
data was collected using the disclosed equity holdings of directors in the annual report and the 
percentage of ownership was calculated against the called up share capital. On October 1st 
2009 section 10 of the Companies Act 2006 came into force that removed the requirement for 
companies to have an authorised share capital. For consistency across all years the percentage 
of ownership was always calculated against the called up share capital. Table C gives a 
breakdown of insider ownership. This data offers support to Renneboog and Zhao’s findings 
of a general trend of increasing insider ownership.44 The mean and median have both 
increased over the five years for executives with notable increases in the mean despite a 
significant drop in the maximum ownership by executive directors. Non-executive ownership 
                                                           
44 L Renneboog and Y Zhao, ‘Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation’ 
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saw a fluctuation in 2008 and 2009 but returned to pre-crash levels by 2010. Thus, for non-
executives the incidence of inside ownership by non-executives appears to have levelled off, 
which is unsurprising since non-executives rarely hold much, if any, equity. The mean and 
median are also considerably lower than that of Renneboog and Zhao’s study. Although the 
sample size of this study is smaller and the sample is taken only from the FTSE 100 rather 
than the full listings on the market, it may actually represent a drop in insider ownership for 
non-executives suggesting greater conformity with governance standards. However, smaller 
companies outside the FTSE 100 may have directors with a higher equitable percentage due 
to a smaller called up share capital or founders sitting as directors on the board, which may 
account for the difference.   
 
Three sectors can be identified as ones where the directors owned higher amounts of 
equity in the company and these may explain the differences in the mean and median, which 
are highly skewed. General mining (mean executive/non-executive - 49.8%/1.9%), oil and 
equipments services (27.6%/0.7%) and financial services (11.0%/4.4%) all had insiders who 
owned a significant portion of the company’s share capital. Kazakhmys had the highest 
executive ownership whilst Schroders NV had the highest non-executive ownership. Due to 
the distribution, as with remuneration, it would be more accurate to rely on the median figures 
to make generalisations about insider ownership. 
Table C: Equity Ownership Breakdown 
Variable (n = 150) Min  Max Mean SD Median 
Executive 
Ownership (%) 
0.00 59.92 3.80 10.69 0.08 
2006  0.00 59.92 3.92 12.25 0.07 
2007 0.00 52.84 3.59 11.07 0.09 
2008 0.00 45.43 3.20 9.54 0.08 
2009 0.00 45.43 4.11 10.49 0.08 
2010 0.01 45.43 4.16 10.61 0.10 
Non-Executive 
Ownership (%) 
0.00 8.10 0.29 0.97 0.01 
2006 0.00 2.50 0.25 0.64 0.01 
2007 0.00 2.54 0.24 0.63 0.01 
2008 0.00 8.10 0.43 1.52 0.01 
2009 0.00 4.83 0.31 0.96 0.01 
2010 0.00 4.80 0.23 0.88 0.01 
 
4.1.4 Agency Problems 
This study uses nine proxies to see if there is a relationship between agency problems 
and multiple directorships for non-executives. These nine proxies are the ratio of LTIS to 
fixed remuneration; executive ownership; executive multiple directorships; ratio of 
independent directors to executives; board size; number of board meetings; number of 
remuneration committee meetings; number of board meetings missed; and CEO-Chair 
duality.  
 
The ratio of independent directors to executives and board size was determined using the 
FTEs. Under the Code companies are advised to have at least half the board represented by 
independent directors.45 In most companies the ratio was at least 1:1 or higher. On the rare 
occasion that it fell below 1 this was normally due to board rotation or unexpected retirement.  
 
As for board meetings missed it was only possible to measure this for directors who had 
served for the full year. This was due to a lack of available data on meeting attendance for 
those joining and leaving the board during the year. When testing for agency problems and 
board meetings missed both non-executive and executive non-attendance were included. 
When identifying board size agency problems it was determined that a board that was too big 
or too small would be deemed to present an agency problem.  
 
To determine whether there was an agency problem in a company a subjective scale 
approach was adopted. Agency problems were scaled between 0-5 except in the case of CEO-
Chairman duality where it was scored 0-1. The greater the agency concern the higher the 
score was awarded depending on pre-determined thresholds. For example, fewer independent 
directors to executives was considered an agency problem. Therefore as the ratio of 
independent directors to executives decreased the higher the score awarded. The 0-5 scale 
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was used where it was possible for it to be considered no agency problem i.e. where no 
meetings were missed or there were no executive multiple directorships, otherwise the scale 
was 1-5. For board size a similar approach was adopted to that of the first method. Where the 
board sized moved away from the centre, the bigger the agency concern.  
 
Table D details the descriptive statistics of these different agency problems. Executive 
directorship and ownership details are outlined in Tables A and C and are not repeated here. 
For duality of CEO-Chair there were twelve incidences of executive chairs serving a full year 
over the five year period and three incidences of an executive chair stepping down showing a 
move towards all companies separating the role, in order to comply with the code.47 Over all 
the company years the incidence of an executive chairing the board was 11.3% and 8% for 
those serving the whole year. 
 
From the data it is observed that executives on average can potentially earn £3 in 
performance pay for every £1 of fixed remuneration. Therefore, potentially, three quarters of 
a director’s overall compensation package is performance related. The biggest ratio of LTIS 
to fixed remuneration was in the banking and financial services sectors. The median ratio 
across all company years from the dataset was 3.10. There is also one and three quarter 
independent non-executives to every executive with the highest average over the five year 
period in the food producers sector with Unilever. Petrofac in the oil equipment and services 
sector had the lowest average ratio for independent directors.   
 
It is the Code’s requirement that directors have enough time to fulfil their duties but it is 
noted that in one instance the board of directors between them missed a total of 35 meetings 
despite the average number of meetings held a year being between 8 and 9. This suggests that 
companies with more appointments may be unable to fulfil all their commitments and are 
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taken as perquisite consumption evidenced by the increase in the agency problem. For board 
size it was seen in Table B that the median was a ratio of 4:7.5 executives to non-executives.  
 
Overall Table D shows the highest level of agency problems was 29 out of 41, which 
three companies scored. These scores were attributed to Kazakhmys in 2006; Arm Holdings 
in 2009; and HSBC Holdings in 2010.  
 
While Table D details the scores of individual company’s agency problems it was 
considered that it is natural for most companies to have agency problems. For example, 
companies are likely to pay directors a fixed fee and LTIS awards. Ultimately, there is no 
escaping some forms of agency problems where there is dispersed ownership. With this in 
mind, indicator variables were created to identify whether companies had an agency problem 
beyond what may be considered “normal”. To identify whether a company had an agency 
problem for each individual variable in this regard, the frequency of agency problems were 
analysed to see how many companies scored each result between 0-5 or 1-5. The category 
where the top 25% of results fell and above was used as the indicator of whether the company 
did or did not have an agency problem. It was presumed that those scoring low on the agency 
scale were representative of normal company behaviour. Those with an agency problem were 
given a value of 1 and those that did not were given the value 0. As well as indicating whether 
a company had a specific agency problem, these individual indicator variables were tallied up 
to identify the total number of agency problems a company had.  
Table D: Agency Problems Breakdown 
Variable (n = 150) Min  Max Mean SD 
Board Meetings 4 25 8.59 2.61 
Remuneration Committee 
Meetings 
0 14 5.50 2.32 
Board Meetings Missed 0 35 3.81 4.31 
Ratio 
Independent:Executives 
0.63 6.67 1.75 0.90 
Ratio LTIS:Fixed 
Remuneration 
0.35 14.84 3.65 2.54 
Board Size 6.00 20.50 11.9 2.89 
Agency Problems 11 29.00 20.43 3.73 
2006 16 29 21.80 3.50 
2007 13 26 20.37 3.30 
2008 11 27 20.47 3.79 
2009 14 29 20.17 3.67 
2010 12 29 19.33 4.14 
 
This gave data for both a total indicator agency problem variable and the individual 
indicator agency problems. The latter allowed the tests to be taken one step further. The 
regression model for the individual agency problems will identify any significant 
relationships between these agency problems and multiple directorships. Those agency 
problems that had a significant relationship with multiple appointments were used to create 
dummy variables. The dummy variables were created based on how many significant agency 
problems a company had. Thus, for example, if a company had one agency problem from 
those identified as significant from the individual analysis then they would be given the value 
of one under the variable “one significant agency problem”. Depending on how many 
significant agency problems there are, all the other dummy variables, i.e. “two significant 
agency problems”, would be given the value of 0. These dummy variables could then be used 
to test Hypothesis 3 and see if multiple appointments relate to these significant agency 
problems. 
 
4.2 Regression models 
4.2.1 Non-executive influences 
Non-executive remuneration and non-executive equity holdings were built in to the model 
using the average totals of both variables to predict the FTE of non-executive multiple 
directorships as the dependent variable. The reason behind using the FTE for the outcome is 
that the study is at company level and thus a measure of company rather than individual 
behaviour per se. The results will help illustrate why companies have non-executives who 
have more external appointments. A larger board is likely to have more multiple directorships 
and higher remuneration due to the volume of directors. The averages of these predictors 
therefore provide a more accurate reflection of the conditions that facilitate multiple 
appointments.  
 Building agency problems into the regression model was done using the total agency 
problems indicator variable as opposed to the subjective scale. As well as including the total 
indicator variable in to the regression model to determine whether there is a relationship 
between agency problems and multiple directorships, each individual indicator variable 
agency problem was included in a separate model. This helped identify individual agency 
problems that had a significant relationship with external appointments. Four significant 
agency problems were identified: total board meetings missed, the presence of an executive 
chairman, executive equity ownership and the ratio of independent directors to executive 
directors. After identifying the individual agency problems, dummy variables were created 
showing whether companies have one, two, three, or four agency problems. The variable 
“four significant agency problems” was omitted from the analysis because no company was 
identified as having these. These variables were used in a regression model to test whether the 
significance of predicting non-executive multiple directorships increased as companies had 
more of these agency problems.50  
 
4.2.2 Multi-level regression analysis 
To further understand the factors that impact on external directorships for non-executives 
the regression analysis will be run for individual years to investigate whether economic 
conditions can impact on the decisions to take external appointments.  
 
Therefore two further regression models are analysed. This analysis is conducted by 
looking at pre and post financial crisis. Therefore the years 2006-2007 are compared against 
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the years 2008-2010. However in business change can take time. Thus any impact of the 
financial crisis on company behaviour may not be immediately apparent. This may bias 
results as changes take place. Therefore the analysis compares 2006-2007 to 2009-2010 and 
omits the year 2008. The same tests are run again this time omitting both 2008 and 2009 and 
comparing 2006-2007 against 2010.  
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Non-executive appointments and corporate governance influences 
.
Initially a correlation analysis was conducted to observe relationships between non-
executive multiple directorships, equity, and remuneration and the company’s agency 
problems, using the indicator variable. From the analysis it was observed that there is a 
significant positive correlation between non-executive appointments and their remuneration 
and negative with equity holdings. This correlation analysis shows early indication that whilst 
increased remuneration may create additional perquisite consumption by non-executives, 
equity holdings may serve as a check on over consumption. There was a non-significant 
negative relationship between non-executive multiple directorships and the agency problem 
indicator. Therefore, those with more appointments may not necessarily shirk their 
responsibilities. Whilst there is no significant relationship between these variables, there was 
one between equity holdings and agency problems. The relationship suggests that whilst 
equity may serve as a check on over consumption of additional appointments, it is also 
associated with more agency problems and bad corporate governance. Thus, where equity 
ownership of non-executives increases they may become more dependent on the company, 
which results in increased agency problems. This supports Masulis and Mobbs’ study that 
non-executives who are reliant on the company become less effective monitors as well as 
Renneboog and Zhao’s study which saw non-executive owners as less effective monitors.52 
As such, increased equity ownership may not be a sufficient resolution to curbing excessive 
consumption of additional appointments for non-executives.    
 
 Table E: Non-Executive Multiple Directorship Predictors  
 B SE B β Sig. t 
Constant 11.70 2.39   4.91 
Remuneration 4.283E-5*** .000013 .27 .001 3.30 
Equity -16.69*** 4.34 -.31 .000 -3.85 
Agency Problem 
(Indicator) 
.81 .44 .16 .066 1.85 
R2 = .15; F = 8.47. *** p <.001 
Dependent Variable: Non-Executive Multiple Directorships 
 
From Table E it is observed that both remuneration and equity significantly 
contribute to predicting the number of non-executive external appointments, whilst agency 
problems do not significantly contribute to the model. The model offers evidence that non-
executives do view additional appointments as a form of perquisite, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
It seems that a company offering higher remuneration does not deter non-executives from 
taking additional appointments. This could be countered by rewarding non-executives in 
equity, which provides support for Hypothesis 2, that when the non-executive’s wealth is tied 
to the value of the company they will accept fewer appointments. However, a company would 
have to be mindful of any trade off this may have with increased agency problems for the 
company. Hypothesis 3, that non-executives will hold fewer appointments where agency 
problems are higher, is not substantiated by this model. 
 
To continue the analysis the indicator agency problem variable was replaced by the 
individual agency problems in the regression model in order to identify any individual agency 
problems that significantly predict the outcome of non-executive external appointments. 
These were identified as those situations where there was a duality of chairman-CEO; low 
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executive equity ownership; the ratio of independent directors to executives and the number 
of board meetings missed. With the exception of the ratio of independent to executive 
directors all agency problems demonstrated a positive correlation with non-executive multiple 
directorships. Therefore non-executives are more likely to take more external directorships 
where there is a duality of chairman-CEO and where directors collectively miss more 
meetings. Where executives hold less equity the results show that non-executives hold more 
external positions when the agency problem of reduced equitable ownership for executives 
arises. Coupled with situations where more meetings are missed and the control of the board 
is with one individual it is suggestive that monitoring may be weaker in companies with a 
larger number of non-executive appointments. This is similar to what Booth and Deli 
observed in regard to a CEO’s decision to take additional appointments where there was a 
lack of growth opportunities in the home company. The control of the board may reduce the 
influence non-executives can have thus they choose to exert their influence and commit their 
time elsewhere. The evidence here is suggestive that where there is less need for non-
executives, or they have less influence, they will hold more appointments.  
 
Where the ratio of independent directors to executives is lower and thus creating 
generating greater agency problems, the number of non-executive appointments fall. This 
offers some support for Hypothesis 3 that non-executives will need to dedicate more time to 
the company as there is potentially more work to be done as there are fewer individuals to 
monitor the executives. However, this finding may also reflect that boards with a lower ratio 
are smaller in general, and thus non-executives will have a smaller number of external 
appointments.   
 
These findings also reject what Ferris et al found regarding meetings attendance.53 
Whilst no significant relationship was found with the amount of meetings held and external 
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appointments, it was observed that more meetings are missed where there are a higher 
number of external appointments. Thus the “busyness hypothesis” is supported and supports 
the notion that additional appointments are a form of perquisite consumption resulting in less 
effective monitoring.  
 
Table F outlines the results for these four individual agency problems using dummy 
variables. The interesting observation is that it is not the existence of agency problems that 
matter, rather it is the concentration of a large number that makes a difference. The results 
demonstrate a positive relationship between the presence of a wide range of significant 
agency problems and multiple directorships. Therefore the results do not support Hypothesis 
3. Rather it appears where a company has increased agency problems their non-executives 
have additional directorships. In consequence having directors with additional appointments 
may not result in better monitoring as submitted by Masulis and Mobbs since the results 
demonstrate agency problems increasing with external appointments. This offers more 
support for the notion that additional appointments for non-executives are perquisite 
consumption and without sufficient controls this could lead to increased self-interest.  
 
Table F: Significant agency problems  
 B SE B β Sig. t 
Constant 13.05 2.10   6.23 
Remuneration 3.584-E** .000013 .22 .005 2.85 
Equity -16.15*** 4.19 -.30 .000 -3.86 
One sig. agency 
problem 
1.91 1.58 .12 .227 1.21 
Two sig. agency 
problems 
2.45 1.81 .13 .177 1.36 
Three sig. agency 
problems 
7.05* 2.59 .23 .007 2.72 
R2 = .17; F = 5.99; *p <.01, **p <0.05, *** p <.001 
Dependent Variable: Non-Executive Multiple Directorships 
 
 
5.2 Multi-level analysis 
There are certainly significant observations to be made from pre and post financial 
crisis. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven predicted that external appointments would increase in 
difficult market conditions. However, it was hypothesised that their decline in worth in the 
managerial labour market would result in fewer additional appointments post-crisis. It is 
observed that pre financial crash the number of external non-executive appointments is higher 
when remuneration is higher, equity is lower and agency problems exist.  
 
The influence of equity is certainly more pronounced pre crisis. For years 2006-2007 
for every one standard deviation in equity non-executives owned (.13493) there would be -
4.97 non-executive appointments. Therefore a one standard deviation increase in equity 
reduces external appointments by 27%. In comparison to remuneration for every one standard 
deviation increase this would raise external appointments by 16%. As a result equity can have 
a larger impact on external appointments than remuneration. Therefore before the crash if a 
company was to compensate its non-executives with £100,000 in total there would be 5.36 
external appointments. If the company was to increase that to £200,000 there would be 10.72 
external appointments. With equity though there is a much sharper impact with the increase in 
equity. Where non-executives owned 0.1% of the equity there would be 3.70 fewer external 
appointments and for 0.2% there would be 7.38 fewer. Thus, whilst increased equity may 
create more agency problems it may be easier to balance the trade-off since you may not have 
to award as much equity to prevent additional appointments resulting in excessive perquisite 
consumption and thus reducing the potential for agency problems. 
 
After the crisis figures for 2008-2010 demonstrate that one standard deviation 
increase in equity (.15681) would result in only -1.69 external appointments. Therefore one 
standard deviation after the crisis only accounts for a 9% reduction in external appointments. 
That is almost half of what was the case in 2006-2007. 2009-2010 demonstrated only a -1.28 
decrease in external appointments for every one increment in standard deviation (.13582) for 
equity. Comparing again to remuneration for non-executives one standard deviation increase 
would raise external appointments by 11%. After the financial crisis, remuneration has a 
bigger influence on the outcome than equity. Therefore, remuneration in comparison to equity 
was more important post crisis, but still had a smaller overall impact on the outcome when 
compared with 2006-2007. Using the example above, the model predicts that if non-
executives are rewarded £100,000 there will be 4.52 external appointments and 9.04 for 
£200,000. Compared to equity, where non-executives hold 0.1% equity there would be 1.06 
fewer appointments. If that increased to 0.2% there would be 2.13 fewer. As a consequence 
companies may have problems in curtailing excessive additional appointments with increased 
equitable ownership due to the potential for increases in agency problems it brings and the 
smaller effect it has. This may be a result of the decrease in opportunities in any one company 
so the non-executive spreads their risk by taking more appointments to increase their ex ante 
remuneration as they see ex post equitable incentives as unattainable.54 As such whilst 
increased appointments may bring about an increase in resources in difficult market 
conditions the evidence suggests that it may result in perquisite consumption that is harder to 
control. 
 
While equity appears to have less impact post-crisis, remuneration plays a similar 
role in predicting non-executive appointments pre and post crisis. This offers support for the 
need for regulation of multiple directorships when equity stops becoming an effective check 
on additional appointments. Thus this study does not support Renneboog and Zhao’s findings 
that those who are more constrained will earn higher fees. If multiple directorships are 
capable of helping a company survive in difficult market conditions however, it would appear 
that higher compensation will help facilitate the creation of them.  
 
Agency problems were also shown to have a significant positive relationship with 
non-executives’ additional appointments pre-2008. Yet, after the financial crash that 
significant relationship disappeared. Before 2008 this supported the notion that those with 
fewer appointments are better monitors. However, post-crash boards do not necessarily have 
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more external appointments relative to agency problems. Therefore the hypothesis that non-
executives will hold fewer appointments where there are more agency problems is rejected 
before the financial crisis and is not substantiated afterwards. This supports what Ferris et al 
argued that executives may be able to impose higher agency costs on the company where the 
non-executives hold more external appointments.  
 
The reason behind this change may be a change in corporate culture as illustrated by 
the call for monitoring from non-executives as in the Walker Review. Non-executive board 
members may have been inclined to ensure governance in a company was improved and thus 
minimising the relationship between agency problems and external appointments. Companies 
may also wish to be perceived as aiming to improve corporate governance standards and thus 
minimising agency problems by moving more in line with the Code. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
From the analysis, whilst the law might protect against the more severe forms of self-
interest that a non-executive might engage in, there is little ex ante control. The relationship 
between the company’s corporate governance systems and non-executives’ external 
appointments is complex. While the existing arguments on regulating additional appointments 
seem to favour no regulation in the UK, the empirical evidence above provides an insight, and 
in many instances appears to support the call for tighter regulation of external appointments. 
It seems non-executives may be taking additional directorships as a form of perquisite 
consumption as well as increasing their external commitments allowing for executives to 
impose higher agency costs on the company. The concentration of agency problems having a 
positive relationship with additional appointments is evidence of this. While governance 
mechanisms, such as equity, may be able to reduce the amount of external appointments this 
may not be an adequate way of reducing self-interest ex ante amongst non-executives. Equity 
awards had a significant correlation with agency problems in the company and its 
significance in relation to how many external appointments the non-executives will hold since 
the economic recession in 2008 has reduced compared to its significance pre-2008. 
 
The evidence that non-executives with more external appointments may be less effective 
monitors is supported by a positive relationship with board meetings missed and other key 
agency problems in the company. As well as these findings, despite the calls from reports 
such as the Walker Review for non-executives to become more involved and annual reports 
declaring that non-executives are required to be paid more due to their increased 
involvement,55 that increase in remuneration appears to be resulting in non-executives taking 
additional appointments as perquisite consumption. The reduced significance that equity has 
on checking this consumption post-crisis may be particularly worrying in ensuring effective 
monitoring. Thus the provisional data collected here would urge caution on policy decisions 
that focus on increasing non-executive appointments without first considering the impact it 
may have on the company’s governance and the non-executives’ self-interest.  
 
Where business and self-interest are endlessly diverse, it seems fundamentally flawed that 
independence is enough to deny self-interest. Governance models should be mindful that 
increased involvement from non-executives might not have the desired effects of improving 
corporate governance since the incentives for non-executive directors are not yet fully 
appreciated. This study offers evidence that non-executives are similarly incentivised 
compared to executives and without checks on that self-interest, problems can occur.    
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